A comprehensive security audit of mobile core networks has uncovered 84 systemic vulnerabilities affecting both 4G/LTE and 5G systems. The research from Singapore's Nanyang Technological University frames these not as isolated bugs, but as a fundamental class of design flaws that could allow attackers to hijack user sessions or cripple entire network segments.
The core network functions—including key components like the Mobility Management Entity (MME), Serving Gateway (SGW), and Packet Gateway (PGW)—form the centralized backbone of mobile infrastructure. A compromise at this level doesn't just affect a single device; it can simultaneously impact vast numbers of subscribers. This centralization makes the findings particularly critical for mobile network operators.
Among the most severe risks is session hijacking, where an attacker could take over a legitimate user's network connection. This goes beyond denial-of-service, potentially enabling the impersonation of subscribers, interception of traffic, and unauthorized use of services. The threat therefore combines privacy, data integrity, and availability risks in a single vector.
The current transitional state of mobile networks multiplies the operational challenge. Many operators run hybrid environments where older 4G Evolved Packet Cores (EPC) operate alongside newer 5G Standalone deployments. This "dual exposure" means both legacy and next-generation systems require urgent attention, and the window for remediation is complex and prolonged.
Remediation requires more than simple patches. The architectural nature of the flaws demands deep operational review. Operators are advised to immediately treat the disclosed vulnerability classes as an audit checklist, applying enhanced monitoring and packet inspection at the core. Vendors must provide detailed technical guidance and patches while strengthening their own internal security testing.
The role of standards bodies becomes crucial in coordinating a global response. Organizations like 3GPP and GSMA need to facilitate consistent disclosure, drive timely remediation across the industry, and enforce stricter security-validation requirements for future core-network designs to prevent recurrence of these patterns.
Specific vendor mitigation timelines are not yet public, but the research makes clear the problem is foundational. The onus is now on the entire telecom ecosystem—operators, vendors, and standards organizations—to translate these academic findings into concrete defensive actions before malicious actors systematically target the same classes of flaws in live networks.
針對流動核心網絡的全面安全審計揭露了84項系統性漏洞，影響涵蓋4G/LTE及5G系統。新加坡南洋理工大學的研究指出，這些問題並非孤立缺陷，而是一類根本性設計瑕疵，可能讓攻擊者劫持用戶會話或癱瘓整個網絡區段。
核心網絡功能——包括移動管理實體（MME）、服務網關（SGW）及分組網關（PGW）等關鍵組件——構成流動基礎設施的集中化骨幹。此層級的受損不僅影響單一設備，更可能同時衝擊大量用戶。這種集中化特性使得發現結果對流動網絡營運商尤為關鍵。
其中最嚴重的風險包括會話劫持，攻擊者或可接管合法用戶的網絡連線。此威脅超越拒絕服務範疇，可能導致用戶偽冒、流量截取及未授權服務使用。因此，單一攻擊向量即同時結合私隱、數據完整性與服務可用性風險。
當前流動網絡的過渡狀態加劇了營運挑戰。許多營運商採用混合環境，既有舊式4G演進封包核心（EPC），同時運行新式5G獨立組網部署。這種「雙重暴露」意味著傳統與新一代系統均需緊急關注，且補救窗口複雜漫長。
修復工作並非簡單補丁可解決。缺陷的架構本質要求深度營運審查。建議營運商立即將已披露的漏洞類別納入審計清單，在核心層面加強監控與封包檢測。供應商須提供詳細技術指引及補丁，同時強化自身內部安全測試。
標準制定機構在協調全球應對方面角色至關重要。3GPP與GSMA等組織需促進一致的漏洞披露機制，推動業界及時補救，並為未來核心網絡設計強制實施更嚴格的安全驗證要求，防止同類問題重演。
各供應商的具體緩解時間表尚未公開，但研究明確指出這是基礎性問題。整個電訊生態系——包括營運商、供應商及標準組織——現在必須將學術研究成果轉化為具體防禦行動，以防範惡意攻擊者系統性地針對線上網絡的同類缺陷發起攻擊。