Telecom security vendor Enea has published research describing two threat actors, dubbed SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA, that operate inside mobile network infrastructure rather than on subscriber handsets — a vantage point that exposes call records and location data across entire subscriber bases, and enables call and SMS interception, without requiring any endpoint compromise, Security Affairs reported.

The significance of the finding lies in where the attackers sit. Signalling-level access through SS7, Diameter, and GTP protocols yields call detail records, subscriber location, and the ability to intercept calls and text messages during call setup. Endpoint encryption, which defenders have spent a decade deploying, offers no protection against metadata exposure or signalling-plane manipulation — the traffic is readable by design at the core network layer.

According to Enea's research, as cited by Security Affairs, SilentAir has maintained footholds inside mobile operators since before 2025. The dwell time measured in years carries a practical warning for defenders: current monitoring baselines and detection rules may postdate the initial compromise, meaning live alerting alone cannot answer whether a network was entered recently or long ago.

Security Affairs noted that a link between SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA remains under investigation by Enea. Until that relationship is established, the two should be treated as distinct campaigns employing similar tradecraft rather than as a coordinated operation. It is worth noting that Enea sells signalling-security tooling, and the indicators and mitigations cited in the coverage sit in its underlying report.

The operational model the research describes exploits a structural weakness in how carriers interconnect. The historic mutual-trust relationship between peer networks — designed for seamless roaming and call routing — functions as a lateral attack path. A single compromised operator can cascade across borders through roaming and interconnect relationships, and lawful-intercept systems are high-value targets by design.

The exposure extends downstream to enterprises that treat mobile channels as private transport. Organisations relying on SMS or mobile voice for out-of-band authentication codes, executive communications, and roaming staff are depending on a transport whose security is now in question at the network level.

On that basis, the research points to three priorities for defenders:

  1. Treat long dwell time as the hard problem. Review historical signalling and access logs, not just live alerting, to establish whether baselines predate the compromise window.
  2. Scrutinise interconnect and roaming partnerships as lateral attack paths. Apply third-party-level risk review to carrier peers and roaming partners, not merely to enterprise vendors.
  3. Deploy purpose-built SS7, Diameter, and GTP monitoring at the interconnect layer. Standard IP-edge perimeter controls were not designed to inspect signalling traffic, leaving this surface uncovered without dedicated tooling.

No local carrier compromise has been claimed in the source reporting. For telecom operators and enterprise security teams across the region — where mobile channels carry significant volumes of authentication and executive traffic — the research is a prompt to verify where signalling monitoring actually sits in their stack, and whether their trust in SMS-based flows survives scrutiny.

Technical indicators and mitigation guidance are available in Enea's full vendor report, referenced in the Security Affairs coverage.

Source: Security Affairs.


電訊安全供應商 Enea 發表研究,描述兩個被稱為 SilentAir 和 LIMINAL PANDA 的威脅行為者(threat actors)。據 Security Affairs 報道,這兩個威脅行為者在流動網絡基礎架構之內活動,而非針對用戶裝置——這一攻擊視角使其得以在無需入侵任何端點的情況下,取得整個用戶群組的通話記錄及位置數據,並具備攔截通話和短訊的能力。

該項發現的關鍵在於攻擊者所處的位置。透過 SS7、Diameter 和 GTP 協定取得的信令層存取權限,可獲取通話詳情記錄(CDR)、用戶位置,並能在通話建立階段攔截通話及短訊。防禦者花了十年部署的端點加密,對元數據外洩及信令面(signalling plane)操控毫無防護作用——在核心網絡層面,此類流量按設計本身就是可讀的。

據 Security Affairs 引述 Enea 的研究,SilentAir 自 2025 年之前已進駐流動營運商內部。以年計的潛伏時間(dwell time)對防禦者構成切實警告:現行的監測基線和偵測規則可能是在初次入侵之後才確立,這意味著單靠即時警報無法判斷網絡是近期還是早已被入侵。

Security Affairs 指出,SilentAir 與 LIMINAL PANDA 之間是否存在關聯,Enea 仍在調查之中。在關聯確立之前,兩者應被視為採用類似攻擊手法的獨立行動,而非一場協調行動。值得一提的是,Enea 本身銷售信令安全工具,而報道所引用的威脅指標及緩解措施均載於其完整報告之內。

該研究描述的運作模式,利用了營運商互聯機制的結構性弱點。對等網絡之間歷史悠久的互信關係——原本為實現無縫漫遊和通話路由而設計——如今成為橫向攻擊路徑。單一被入侵的營運商可透過漫遊及互聯關係跨越邊界擴散,而合法截聽(lawful intercept)系統按設計本身就是高價值攻擊目標。

有關風險亦向下延伸至將流動渠道視為私密傳輸方式的企業。依賴 SMS 或流動通話發送帶外(out-of-band)驗證碼、處理高層管理人員通訊,以及供經常外地公幹的員工使用的機構,所依賴的這一傳輸層,其安全性在網絡層面已受到質疑。

據此,研究指出防禦者應優先處理三項事宜:

  1. 將長期潛伏視為最棘手的問題。 檢視歷史信令及存取日誌,而不僅是即時警報,以確認監測基線是否早於入侵時段確立。
  2. 將互聯及漫遊合作夥伴視為橫向攻擊路徑加以審視。 對營運商對等節點及漫遊夥伴套用第三方級別的風險審查,而不僅限於企業供應商。
  3. 在互聯層部署專為 SS7、Diameter 和 GTP 而設的監測系統。 標準的 IP 邊緣邊界防護原本並非為檢查信令流量而設,若沒有專用工具,此攻擊面將無法覆蓋。

原始報道中並未提及本港營運商有被入侵的情況。對於區內電訊營運商和企業安全團隊而言——流動渠道承載著大量驗證及高層通訊流量——該研究是一次提醒,要求他們核實信令監測實際上位於技術架構的哪一層,以及他們對 SMS 流程的信任是否經得起檢驗。

技術指標及緩解指引載於 Enea 的完整供應商報告,詳見 Security Affairs 的報道。

來源:Security Affairs。

新聞來源 / Original News Source